Minns undermines counter-terrorism

At a news conference, NSW Premier Chris Minns declared that the use of "global intifada" was instrumental in the antisemitism that he believes led to Australia’s worst terrorist attack. In doing so, he both signalled political alignment with pro-Zionist narratives and, more importantly, that his response to terror was going to be performative politics. The response of our leaders, our security organisations and our legislature is critical to minimising the chances that the events of 14 December will be repeated.

Although we have, thankfully, experienced few mass killings in Australia, we do know quite a lot about terrorism and counterterrorism. We know that terrorist attacks and, indeed, most mass killings, are 'devilishly' difficult to prevent. Once the accusations and politicisation subside and Sussan Ley has retreated into her own irrelevance and Minns has finished placating Zionists, the issue of counterterrorism will still be one we must face - rationally and thoroughly.

We know that terrorism is a global phenomenon. The Global Terrorism Index gives a clear picture of where we have come from and the current status across the world. We know, for example, that the country most affected by terrorism is Burkina Faso, where Islamist extremists continued to exact a heavy toll on the country's political stability and peace. Both ISIS and AL Qaeda affiliated groups operate in Burkina Faso, and the country has been recognised as the global epicentre of terrorism. In terms of the GTI it has been the unrivalled leader.

In 2014, the US, UK and China languished in the top 20 states plagued by terror and various responses, such as "the war on terror", were demonstrably failures. Australia, by contrast, was in an incredibly favourable position. However, this position on the GTI was skewed by the Bali bombings of 2002 being considered to be an Indonesian problem, not an Australian problem. This is significant, as it triggered a powerful response by Indonesia that was not matched by Australia. (One might note that Australia, unlike the US and NATO, did not unleash a bombing campaign to rid Indonesia of 'training camps').

Indonesia's response was direct and effective. In the immediate aftermath of the 2002 bombings, Indonesia shifted its counter-terrorism approach from military-led to police-led, with the establishment of Densus 88 an elite counter-terrorism unit. Densus 88 focused on high-level leaders rather than mass arrests. They successfully captured or killed key figures, including the "money man" Hambali, the bomb-maker Azahari Husin, and the strategist Noordin M. Top. In 2008, the South Jakarta District Court officially declared Jemaah Islamiyah an illegal organization.

Indonesia is often cited as a global model for its "soft" approach to terrorism, which focused on changing the mindset of militants rather than just punishing them. But the critics are silenced by the success of the Indonesian response, which, in 2017 stood above Germany, the US, UK in the GTI. Police and religious scholars engaged in ideological debates with imprisoned JI members to challenge their interpretation of "jihad." The government provided financial aid, school fees for children, and medical care for the families of terrorists. This "kindness" strategy aimed to break the cycle of resentment and prove the state was not an "enemy of Islam". Upon release, many former members were given "start-up" funds or vocational training to open small businesses, preventing them from returning to extremist networks out of necessity.

Indonesian authorities eventually dismantled JI's complex financial infrastructure. In 2020-2021, police discovered that JI was funding itself through a massive network of over 20,000 charity donation boxes placed outside minimarkets and mosques across Indonesia. By cutting off these "legitimate" funding streams, the government forced the group into a state of "hibernation" and eventual bankruptcy.

China also took a similar multi-layered approach. In Xinjiang, where independence movements have been active but contained, radicalisation of Islamic groups followed the 'war on terror' and the moderate Sufi Islam had been overwhelmed by radical elements from Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan. Historically, Uyghur cultural practices included drinking various alcoholic drinks, engaging in dancing and singing as normal elements of their culture, women did not cover their heads, young men were generally clean shaven.

In the early 2000s, Uyghur women were being prevented from being educated or being employed or moving around on their own. Young men trained in terror in countries such as Syria. Radicalising videos and publication became dominant. New ISIS style groups emerged, such as the East Turkestan Islamic Movement. ETIM militants declared their intent to violently overthrow Chinese rule and ethnically cleanse any Han Chinese Muslims.

Although roundly criticised in the West, the Chinese response was direct and substantial. Extremism was identified by 'indicators' of radicalisation, especially in the preaching or disseminating radicalising material. Too late, China realised that the relative poverty of Xinjiang had fostered extremism. In 2014, they began a deradicalisation program focused on vocational skills and 'de-programming'. Girls were given compulsory education, and it became illegal for women to be constrained from employment. Uyghur men and women were given education incentives far beyond any offered elsewhere in China and learning Mandarin became compulsory. Incentives were offered to corporations to invest and build in Xinjiang. Massive economic development occurred, and Xinjiang made the fastest transition from a low HDI region to a HDI equivalent to other Chinese provinces, developing faster than any other region in South Asia.

In addition, surveillance increased dramatically. Although criticised throughout the West as oppressive, this surveillance was unremarkable. CCTV and facial recognition was already in use in the UK, US, Australia and the EU, bulk data collection (telecom metadata, licence plates, border data) was widely used, social media data harvesting was common, predictive policing tools (risk scoring, hotspot mapping) were being used, biometric databases (passports, visas, fingerprints) were being employed and mass interception programs, such as that exposed by the National Security Agency programs revealed by Snowden, were not uncommon. We cannot escape that surveillance, and AI enhanced surveillance, may be key to early recognition of terrorism.

Human rights groups have criticised the Chinese approach, claiming that Uyghurs were targeted for "normal activities". However, many of the behaviours cited as evidence of ethnic or religious targeting in Xinjiang, such as mosque attendance patterns, overseas travel, and online activity, are standard indicators used in counter-extremism frameworks worldwide. Given Xinjiang’s demographic composition, disproportionate impact on Uyghurs is not, on its own, evidence of discriminatory intent. The critical question is not whether such indicators were monitored, but how they were weighted, interpreted, and acted upon, and whether individuals had meaningful avenues to contest adverse conclusions.

Interestingly, Human Rights Watch, one of the strongest critics of China's Xinjiang counterterrorism, has monitored and reported on ISIS and Islamist extremism, but failed to identify this influence in Xinjiang or report on the presence of ETIM training in Syria - a discrepancy that weakens the credibility of their assertions. If ISIS was a problem in Syria and Iraq (and many other places) why should it be considered any less important in China?

The attack by Brenton Tarrant on Muslims in Christchurch is a sobering lesson in counter-terrorism failure. Not only did New Zealand not have a definition in law for terrorism, but its lax gun laws made Tarrant's acquisition of weapons unconstrained. Defining terrorism is critical in counterterrorism because it gives certain powers and resources to act decisively against a terror plot. A slow deterioration in our own gun laws has created the opportunity for greater carnage.

More importantly, the Christchurch mass killing showed that terrorism, although ultimately a product of a radicalised mind, is internally coherent to the perpetrator. Tarrant had been radicalised in Eastern Europe and had published a manifesto focused on the Replacement Theory. He did little to hide this radicalisation and its discovery might have saved lives. Tarrant considered his actions morally sound. This is why identifying and addressing radicalisation is far more important in counterterrorism than slinging around politically loaded statements about antisemitism.

Minns’ proclamation that there is a connection between protests that mention 'global intifada' and terrorism illustrates how poor his understanding is of the process of terrorism. Unless 'due diligence' is done on the radicalising ideology, predicting the actions of a terrorist is impossible. As evidence from Bondi shows clearly, radicalisation from ISIS was a key element, as was travel to a 'training camp'. Antisemitism, part from that espoused by ISIS, is almost irrelevant. Even if the National Socialist Network had marched on that day, their actions were irrelevant to someone trained in ISIS ideology.

In fact, the obsession with antisemitism and pro-Palestinian protests makes our counter-terrorism capacity weaker, as attention and resources are taken away from the sources of radicalisation.

Now that we have experienced the shock of terror, the hard work of de-radicalisation must begin. We must tighten our gun laws, tighten our surveillance, sharpen our definitions and find those indicators that are real, not a product of political performance. This is not about populism or Zionist appeasement. It's about the real issue of terrorism.